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very much enjoyed reading Jeff Schott’s paper.
When I agreed to discuss it, I knew only its pro-
posed title “The WTO: Its Performance to Date and
Current Issues.”  The paper I received, however, has
a different and catchy title borrowed from the title
of a highly successful ﬁlm.  The changed title also
is reﬂected in the paper’s forward-looking theme
of the proposed new round of multilateral trade
negotiations (MTN).  I ﬁrmly reject the appellation
“Millennium Round” with its link to a particular
religion.  In Schott’s paper, the performance of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) to date is touched
upon only incidentally.
Jeff rightly points out that there are complex
issues relating to whether this is the opportune time
to initiate a new round of MTN, and if it is, whether
its coverage should be limited or broad, and whether
a relatively short span of three years should be set
for the conclusion of the negotiations.  Nonetheless,
Jeff is convinced about the importance of proceed-
ing promptly with a new round.  While I am sympa-
thetic to his view, I also am somewhat skeptical
about many of the arguments Jeff and others have
advanced for starting a new round.  Let me discuss
each of them in turn.  
Jeff argues that the global ﬁnancial crisis of
1998-99 has dampened political support for new
trade reforms and, therefore, a new round of MTN
is needed to bring the reform process on track.  Set-
ting aside the point that it is somewhat of an exag-
geration to state that the recent ﬁnancial crisis in a
few countries in East Asia and Latin America, and
Russia is a global ﬁnancial crisis, there is no strong
evidence that because of these ﬁnancial crises re-
forms aimed at further liberalization of trade ﬂows—
as contrasted to liberalization of ﬁnancial ﬂows—
have perceptibly slowed down.  If anything, ana-
lysts and policy-makers have tried to draw a dis-
tinction between liberalizing trade and liberalizing
ﬁnance. They have argued that there is no reason
to go slow on the former even though—accord-
ing to some, though by no means all, or even a
majority—there are strong arguments for slowing
down the latter.
A second argument is a version of the old cliché,
“the bicycle theory of trade liberalization,” namely,
unless there is forward momentum for liberalizing
access to markets everywhere, protectionist forces
will gather strength—particularly in major trading
nations and groups, such as the United States and
the European Union (EU).  Jeff suggests that once the
U.S. expansion ceases and unemployment rises,
protectionist demands will rise.  He also points to
the impasse over the renewal of the fast-track author-
ity of the U.S. president to negotiate reduction of
trade barriers, the resistance to new trade initia-
tives, and the attacks on the WTO in the United States
and the European Union as evidence of his point.  
I am not entirely persuaded.  The unholy alli-
ance of protectionists—consisting of industrial labor
unions in rich countries, such as the American Fed-
eration of Labor and Congress of Industrial Orga-
nizations (AFL-CIO), masquerading as champions of
the welfare and rights of workers (particularly child
and female workers) in emerging markets, naive do-
gooders who may be genuinely concerned with the
welfare of children, and misguided environmental-
ists—would have mounted its campaign against
fast-track-authority regardless of the level of unem-
ployment in the United States.  In the same vein, it is
unlikely that the alliance of protectionist unions and
environmentalists in the European Union would
give up its attacks on WTO even if the unemploy-
ment rate in major European countries were much
lower than it is.  In any case, unless such alliances
could be persuaded that a new round of MTN will
indeed forge agreements that allay their concerns,
the fact that they are attacking the WTO is not a
strong reason to start another round.
I do not quite understand what Jeff means when
he says that “the WTO requires that restrictions on
trade in products developed through new biotech-
nologies must be underpinned by sound scientiﬁc
evidence of potential harm.”  True, this require-
ment is speciﬁed in Article II, paragraph 2, of the
Uruguay Round (UR) agreement on the Application
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures, but, it also
is subject to an exception speciﬁed in Article V,
paragraph 7, that allows provisional measures to
be adopted when relevant scientiﬁc evidence is
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insufﬁcient.  Be that as it may, it is misleading to say
that the WTO as an organization requires such a
restriction. The agreement establishing the WTO
only requires that it facilitate the implementation
of the agreements into which its members have
entered.  Such agreements, being part of the
Uruguay Agreement as a single undertaking, are 
(in any case) binding on all members of the WTO.
Critics of the WTO have the wrong target:  Instead
of persuading members to amend or scrap their
agreement on sanitary and phytosanitary
measures, they are attacking the WTO, which is
merely a facilitator of the implementation of the
agreement.  Starting a new round could satisfy 
the critics of the WTO on this ground, only if the
repeal or amendment of the sanitary agreement 
is part of the agenda of the new round.  It is very
unlikely that this would be the case.
Jeff correctly argues that the considerably
strengthened (relative to the original agreement in
1947) Dispute Settlement System of the WTO has
run into a number of problems that need to be cor-
rected.  Some of the problems are of great concern
to the developing country members of the WTO.  I
will discuss this issue later.  While it could be part
of the agenda of a new round, by itself it is not a
compelling reason to start one.  Indeed, it could 
be addressed through one of Jeff’s own proposed
mini-rounds or round-ups.  
Among other structural problems of the WTO
system that Jeff views as needing correction is the
WTO’s management structure, which he compares
unfavorably with those of the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and World Bank.  I am puzzled by this
comparison.  The WTO has no resources to distribute
nor does it have much of an executive role.  As
speciﬁed in Article III of the agreement establishing it,
the WTO’s functions involve facilitating the imple-
mentation of the agreements among its members,
providing a forum for negotiation, and administering
the Dispute Settlement System and the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism.  None of these call for any
standing executive board such as the one that both the
IMF and World Bank have.  True, the various Councils
of the WTO are unwieldy and its supreme decision-
making body, namely its ministerial conference,
meets only once every two years. A simple decision
at the Seattle ministerial—to create a steering com-
mittee that is larger than the quad and meets peri-
odically—ought to take care of this problem.  
Jeff argues that the quad consisting of the most
powerful members of the WTO has no interest in
relinquishing its informal role as a steering committee.
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (1999) also laments about the unequal dis-
tribution of power in the WTO in saying:
Underlying these concerns is the more
basic question of whether it is in the interest
of developing countries to enter into nego-
tiations with wealthier trading partners from
a position of chronic weakness not only in
terms of economic power but also in terms
of research, analytical and intellectual sup-
port and negotiating skills. (p. 40)
This lament is somewhat beside the point.  On
the one hand, as Winham (1989) pointed out in his
comments regarding the differences between some
developing countries and others on whether the
Uruguay Round should be launched:
It was a brutal but salutary demonstra-
tion that power would be served in that
nations comprising 5 percent of world trade
were not able to stop a negotiation sought
by nations comprising 95 percent of world
trade.  (Winham, 1989, p. 54, as cited in
Srinivasan, 1998, p. 35)
On the other hand, unlike the World Bank, the IMF,
and the United Nations Security Council, in the WTO
each member has one vote and the convention is
that all decisions are by consensus.  Thus, develop-
ing country members can have a much greater say
in the WTO decisions than their power, as measured
by their share in world trade would warrant.
I agree with Jeff that the size of the WTO 
Secretariat and the budgetary resources of the orga-
nization are inadequate to discharge effectively its
functions and responsibilities.  Nonetheless, it is
the small size and high quality of its staff that explain
why the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) was perhaps the most cost-effective and efﬁ-
cient among multilateral organizations.  Certainly
more resources ought to be provided.  I would sug-
gest that a small share of the net income of the
World Bank be provided to the WTO; but, I will be
wary of excessive expansion of its staff.  There is
the danger that, if it becomes too large, the WTO
will be as bloated, self-serving, and expensive as
the bureaucracies of the United Nations, the IMF,
and the World Bank. 
Only one of Jeff’s arguments for initiating a
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in agenda of the UR agreement, appears strong.  This
argument is that a new and comprehensive round
will allow countries to trade off concessions, in the
time-honored mercantilist tradition of GATT, across
sectors and issues and undertake obligations to lib-
eralize longstanding and politically sensitive trade
barriers.  Certainly selling any agreement of trade
liberalization that involves political costs of hurting
the interests of some groups (that is, producers of
importables) in a country would be easier if it also
involves political gains by beneﬁting other interest
groups (that is, producers of exportables, and users
of importables).  Such a balance is more likely if
several issues are part of the negotiating agenda.
Achieving a politically balanced portfolio through
a mercantilist exchange of liberalization among
countries is to be sharply distinguished from wel-
fare gains from trade liberalization per se.  For most
members of the WTO, unilateral liberalization of one
or more sectors would bring in net welfare gains
without a mercantilist exchange of each country’s
liberalization with others.  Of course, domestic com-
pensation of losers by gainers from unilateral liber-
alization still would be needed.  In any case, as Fred
Brown and John Whalley (1980) showed in their
work on the various formulas proposed for tariff
reductions in the Tokyo Round, the proposer of
each formula gained (in welfare terms) more from
the formulas of others than from its own!  This
suggests that negotiators were ignorant of what
could be the best deal for them as they discussed
various proposals.  As such, the seemingly strong
argument, which stated that negotiations with a
comprehensive agenda are likely to produce agree-
ments that are deemed satisfactory by all parties, 
is not so strong after all—if the outcome of negotia-
tions is judged by welfare considerations.  Of
course, this is no surprise—after all, once politics
come in, coherence and rationality go out!
Jeff states that only universal membership
would make WTO a truly global system, by which
he presumably means a system that includes all
autonomous customs jurisdictions of the world.
Jeff complains that the progress towards this goal,
though good, is not good enough, because the “entry
bar (for accession to the WTO) has been elevated to
record heights just as the demand for WTO mem-
bership has increased dramatically!”  Strictly speak-
ing, Article XII on accession to the WTO is no more
demanding or difﬁcult than Article XXXIII of GATT.
Jeff’s proposal to tailor accession protocols to suit
the particular background and economic system
of a country seeking membership seems to be an
extension, to the entry stage, of the special and
more favorable treatment for developing-country
contracting parties in the old GATT.  I have argued
elsewhere that this special treatment was not in the
interest of developing countries because it enabled
developed countries to implement the Multiﬁber
Arrangement (MFA) and other schemes that violated
the core principles of GATT, such as most-favored
nations treatment and the non-use of quantitative
restrictions.  It also allowed developing countries to
maintain high trade barriers and pursue their costly
import-substituting industrialization strategy.  I do
not believe special membership access in protocols
would be in the interests of those seeking member-
ship.  This is not to say, however, that imposing con-
ditions on aspiring members—that existing mem-
bers do not have to satisfy—is justiﬁed. 
Let me turn to Jeff’s proposals for the negotiating
agenda in the next round.  On agriculture, the Uruguay
Round did not go far.  It did not integrate agriculture
fully into the WTO system.  The core disciplines,
such as outright prohibition of quantitative restric-
tions and subsidization of exports that apply to trade
in manufactures, still do not apply to agricultural
trade. The Uruguay Round agreement merely reduced
the scope of allowable subsidies and restrictions
without eliminating them.  The scandalous process
of “dirty tarifﬁcation” precluded any hope of
signiﬁcant liberalization.  The notorious Common
Agriculture Policy (CAP) of the European Union (EU)—
to the extent it reduced the prices of its agricultural
exports—did beneﬁt some developing country im-
porters.  Nonetheless, overall, the distortions
introduced by CAP, various quotas in the United
States and other developed countries, as well as the
insulation of their domestic agriculture from world
markets by many developing countries, are large.
Whether through the mandated review or a part of
the agenda of a new round, agricultural trade should
be brought fully under the disciplines of WTO at last.
The General Agreement Trade in Services (GATS)
also is up for review.  The failure to come to an agree-
ment on movement of natural persons is a major
blow for developing countries.  The postponed nego-
tiations on Maritime Services are due for resumption
in 2000, whether or not there is a new round.  Also,
the fact that GATS is not GATT when it comes to most
favored nation (MFN) or national treatment has to
be kept in mind. Jeff’s pessimism about agreeing
on a meaningful agenda for negotiating liberal-
ization of services trade indeed is warranted.
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On tariffs, there is no doubt that addressing
tariff peaks, as well as tariff escalation by stage pro-
cessing, has to be high on the agenda.
Anti-dumping as a trade policy instrument is a
virus that has spread from industrial to developing
countries.  For obvious reasons, it is now the pre-
ferred means of administered protection for protec-
tionists everywhere.  Although some recent theoriz-
ing seems to infuse some life into predation argu-
ments, its practical signiﬁcance seems virtually nil.
As such, there is no economic rationale for the use
of anti-dumping actions, which is a discriminatory
measure.  Instead of attempting to restrict its scope,
and the circumstances under which it could be
used, I would rather make the use of anti-dumping
actions WTO-illegal altogether and strengthen, if
necessary, nondiscriminatory safeguards already
available under Article XIX of the GATT.
On the environment, thus far, by failing to come
up with any recommendations, the WTO’s Committee
on Trade and Environment fortunately has spared
the global trading system from crippling constraints.
I would like to see it wound up, once and for all,
and have the important environmental issues be
taken up at more appropriate forums, such as the
United Nations Environmental Programme (NEP).
At the ﬁrst two ministerials of WTO, the par-
ticipants have courageously, wisely, and clearly
expressed themselves against introducing a “social
clause” in the WTO.  I would hope the participants
at the Seattle ministerial would have similar courage.
I am not convinced that investment issues, which
go beyond those already included in the Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreement, are ripe for
multilateral negotiations.  Until they are, current
national policies and restrictions should be made
more transparent and widely disseminated. Turning
to competition policy, I would argue that in most
tradeable products (other than very few, such as wide-
bodied jet aircraft) the world market is large relative
to the minimum efﬁcient scale of operation. As
such, for such products and for most countries, the
most effective competition policy is to allow free
competition from the rest of the world.  This means
not only traditional trade barriers should be lowered,
but regulatory barriers and administered protection
should be eliminated as well.
Regarding the dispute-settlement system,
Bernard Hoekman and Petros Mavroidis (1999) have
raised a number of serious issues, particularly from
the perspective of developing countries.  While a
system based on clearly speciﬁed rules and a fair
and transparent process for enforcing them—as well
as adjudicating disputes over their interpretation—
is undoubtedly in the interest of the weak, and
WTO’s dispute-settlement procedures meet these
desiderata in good measure, Hoekman and Mavroidis
rightly point out that there are a number of serious
deﬁciencies in the system.  First of all, for poor coun-
tries, access to the system is expensive and the infor-
mation and expertise required to present and win a
case are formidable.  Second, there are fundamental
weaknesses in the enforcement mechanism.  As
has been amply demonstrated by the banana case,
a defendant can delay compliance with an adverse
panel decision without appearing to have failed 
to comply.  Third, the only recourse that a plaintiff
has for addressing the failure of the defendant to
abide by the panel decision is to raise its own trade
barriers against the defendant’s exports. Obviously,
such a punishment forces the plaintiff to forego
gains from trade and, therefore, is costly to both
parties.  Further, it punishes the wrong group in
both countries without providing any relief to 
the injured group.
Any import restriction beneﬁts the producer of
import substitutes in the defendant country, while
it hurts the exporters and import users.  By raising
its own barrier on imports from the defendant for
failing to comply with a panel decision, the plaintiff
does not offer any relief to its own exporters.  It
hurts users of imports from the defendant, and
helps producers of substitutes for imports.  At the
same time, it also hurts the interests of exporters
and import users in the defendant country, while
the producers of import substitutes continue to
enjoy the beneﬁts afforded by the impugned restric-
tion.  Moreover, whether a small and weak plaintiff
will actually raise the barriers is, itself, doubtful.  
If the defendant is a large and powerful country,
the plaintiff may not wish to jeopardize their rela-
tionship.  This suggests that large and powerful
traders may be able to get away with violations that
hurt the interests of the weak and, anticipating this, 
the weak may not bring such violations before the
dispute-settlement system.  Fortunately, thus far,
some developing countries have not refrained 
from bringing disputes against the powerful to the
WTO, and the powerful have complied with panel
decisions that went against them.  Nonetheless,
one cannot be certain that this happy situation 
will continue to prevail in the future.
Any non-compliance with a panel decision against
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injures other members whose interests are affected
by that violation, it also erodes the credibility of the
rules-based system itself.  Nonetheless, unless the
members—whose interests are affected adversely—
bring the violation before the dispute-settlement
system, there is no way the system can recognize the
violation.  Not all violations need be brought before
the system.  I already have noted that the weak may
not bring complaints against violators before the
system either because of lack of resources, expertise,
and information, or because of the possibly adverse
impact on non-trade aspects of their relationships with
the violators.  It also is likely that the powerful may
not bring weak violators before the system either,
because the violators’ markets for their product is too
small for the loss from violations to be signiﬁcant.  
If violations are widespread, but few of them are
brought before the dispute-settlement system, the
credibility of the rules-based trading system as a
whole—and not just that of its dispute-resolution
mechanism—will be eroded.  Whether the WTO Sec-
retariat should be empowered to bring before a panel
any violation of rules—regardless if those hurt by the
violation do so themselves—or whether there should
be an independent prosecutor in the WTO who will
be charged with such a task, has to be examined.  It
would be desirable to increase the technical assistance
given to developing countries under Article XXVII,
paragraph 2, of the Dispute-Settlement Understanding
of the UR Agreement, and extend this article to make
such assistances available at the “exploratory or dis-
covery” stage prior to submission of disputes to WTO.
For reasons advanced by Levy and Srinivasan (1996),
however, it is not a good idea to allow private parties
access to the WTO’s dispute-settlement system. 
Jeff does not mention the recent proliferation
of regional free-trade agreements.  As is well known,
in such agreements the phrase “free trade” does
not have its natural meaning of multilateral free
trade.  It means that trade freedom is preferential
and applies only to trade among its members.  Such
preferential trade agreements violate the core MFN
principle of GATT and, as such, from the very begin-
ning of GATT, an exception from MFN principle had
to be made for them.  Such an exception is allowed
under Article XXIV of GATT, subject to certain con-
ditions and a formal review of any proposed agree-
ment by a working party established by GATT to
examine whether it meets the conditions.  
Although many working parties were estab-
lished to review proposed customs unions and free-
trade areas in the history of GATT, few have sub-
mitted their reports.  And interestingly, no working
party ever pronounced on the compatibility of the
European Union with Article XXIV, the reason
being that the European Union was originally
formed primarily for political, and not economic,
reasons.  Given that the powerful U.S. and the EU
members stood behind the European Union, there
was no serious examination of its compatibility
with Article XXIV.  Attempts are being made to con-
fer respectability to the blatantly discriminatory
(that is, preferential) trade preferences of such agree-
ments under the cloak of oxymoronic “open region-
alism.”  These ought to be rejected.  If there is a
next round, negotiators ought to repeal Article XXIV.
Instead they should require that any proposed free
trade agreement or customs union be deemed con-
sistent with WTO, only if the preferences granted to
its members are extended automatically to all mem-
bers of the WTO on a MFN basis at the end of, say,
ﬁve years after the start of such an agreement.
Let me conclude with a few remarks on the con-
cerns of developing countries.  Jeff lists several beneﬁts
for the developing countries by participating in any
new round of MTN.  He rightly stresses that the inter-
ests of developing countries vary and this diversity
makes it difﬁcult to outline what their agenda for
negotiations ought to be.  While I agree with him that
a rules-based system is in the interests of the developing
countries, it is not clear how Jeff reaches the conclu-
sion that it is in their interests to participate in a new
round.  Jeff and others argue that participation in 
the MTN helps developing countries undertake and
“lock-in” domestic reforms.  Prima facie, it does
appear plausible that authorities in power could
make commitments as part of the agreement that
emerges from MTN and then diffuse opposition to
reforms by linking them with the fulﬁllment of com-
mitments. Unless the punishment for reneging on
commitments is credible, as well as costly, such
commitments alone will not be effective tools for
diffusing opposition in reforms and locking them in. 
As Jeff suggests, other beneﬁts to developing
countries, such as from the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development’s liberal-
ization of agriculture, liberalization in service
sectors, and reduction in tariff peaks and tariff
escalation, could be signiﬁcant.  I would reiterate
Jeff’s caution that unless developing countries are
persuaded that the rich will not seek to avoid or
evade fulﬁlling their commitments in the UR 
agreement, they will be wary of entering any 
new round.  Indeed, because the agreement to
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phase-out MFA was backloaded, and even before 
the phase-out anti-dumping measures had been
invoked to curb imports of textile and apparel
imports, developing countries seriously doubt
whether the MFA will be phased out in 2005 as 
was agreed to in the Uruguay Round.  This is yet
another reason why anti-dumping should be elimi-
nated as a WTO-legal trade-policy instrument.
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